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BEYOND WEALTH: STORIES OF ART, WAR, AND GREED
Mary Ellen O'Connell*
There is something about great art that can move otherwise law-
abiding people to seek to acquire it even by taking advantage of the chaos
and desperation of war. This Article concerns three stories of art acquisi-
tion in war. The first is the story of ancient mosaics taken from Cyprus
after the 1974 Turkish invasion; the second is the story of five paintings
by the great Viennese artist Gustav Klimt acquired around World War II;
and the third is about a Sumerian statue that disappeared from an Iraqi
museum sometime after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq began in March
2003. The statue turned up in the summer of 2005 in a Brooklyn ware-
house. All three stories provide glimpses of great artistic achievement as
well as great desire and great greed. Each story also concerns international
law and, in each, a failure of American decision-makers to look to the
applicable international law. This failure is particularly curious with re-
spect to these cases because in each the relevant international law sup-
ported outcomes various decision-makers were quite evidently seeking.
The cases indicate unfamiliarity or discomfort with international law in the
United States today, problems the legal academy might well address if the
United States is to take greater advantage of the benefits international law
has to offer.
MOSAICS OF THE AUTOCEPHALOUS GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH OF
CYPRUS
The first of these revelatory stories is about a group of mosaics that
were once a single work created to decorate a sixth century church on the
island of Cyprus. The facts of this story are taken largely from Autoce-
phalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
a 1989 decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana' and the 1990 decision on the appeal to the Seventh Circuit.2 The
* Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. With thanks
for research assistance to Lenore VanderZee, LL.M. This Article is based on a lecture given at the
University of Alabama School of Law as part of the Meador Lecture Series on Wealth.
1. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
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District Court decision was affirmed by a three-judge panel,3 but only one
judge, Cudahy, in his concurring opinion discusses the relevant interna-
tional law despite the fact that the case involved at least six countries, in-
ter-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organiza-
tions, treaties, customary international law, war, and occupation.4 Even he
only raises international law as an additional point in support of the deci-
sion and not as the law of the case.5 Rather, all four judges who heard the
case held that Indiana law was the proper law.6 As will be discussed be-
low, the case for international law as the proper law seems far stronger.7
International law has treaties and customary rules specifically devoted to
the protection of cultural property in war and occupation, in particular, the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict,8 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization's Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Pre-
venting the Illicit Transport, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultur-
al Property,9 and the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907.10 Applying interna-
tional law would have been the right choice of law for the case of these
ancient mosaics."
The four mosaics in the case were originally one mosaic created in
530 A.D. for a Greek Orthodox Church on Cyprus called the Church of
the Panagia Kanakaria in the village of Lythrankomi. 2 It depicted Jesus as
a young boy seated with his mother Mary on a throne.13 The figures of
Jesus and Mary were flanked by two archangels, and the central figures
were bordered by a frieze consisting of busts of the twelve apostles. 14 The
mosaic somehow survived both the period of "iconoclasm" and the ravag-
es of time.' 5 It should have been destroyed a thousand years ago when in
the eighth century edicts mandated the destruction of religious images so
they would not be the subject of veneration. 16 These iconoclast edicts were
largely successful as the original Kanakaria mosaic is one of only six or
seven Byzantine mosaics to have survived to this date.
17
3. Id. at 279.
4. See id. at 294-97 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
5. See id. at 295-97.
6. Id. at 286-87, 294 (majority opinion).
7. See infra notes 79-123 and accompanying text.
8. May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
9. Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
10. Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV) of 1907].
11. See the discussion of art and antiquities being acquired in war-torn Iraq and the law that
should protect them, infra notes 223-266 and accompanying text.
12. 717 F. Supp. at 1377.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1377-78 (citing A.H.S. MEGAW AND E.J.W. HAWKINS, THE CHURCH OF THE PANAGIA
KANAKARIA AT LYTHRANKOMI IN CYPRUS: ITS MOSAICS AND FRESCOES (1977)).
15. Id. at 1377.
16. Id.
17. See id.
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Cyprus, the island where the Kanakaria Church is found, was a British
colony from 1878 until it became independent in 1960.8 In 1963, howev-
er, conflict broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 19 The United
Nations intervened, establishing a peacekeeping force that has been in
place ever since, but in 1974, Turkey invaded, taking control of more than
a third of the island.2' Turkey argued that it had the right to intervene un-
der a treaty with Britain and Greece providing for the protection of the
Turkish minority on Cyprus. 21 The use of force was generally condemned,
however, and only Turkey had recognized the entity it established, the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), as of the time of the
case. 22 In addition to using force in apparent violation of international law,
Turkey also failed to follow the international law of occupation in taking
control of northern Cyprus. A report by the European Commission of
Human Rights found:
a. During the military invasion and the first weeks after the cessa-
tion of the fighting, the Turkish troops committed looting and
plundering on a large scale and an indiscriminate destruction of
immovable, but mainly movable, property belonging to Greek Cy-
priots....
b. In the early stages of the occupation, the systematic usurpation
and occupation of immovable property, mainly by the Turkish in-
vading armed forces, was an everyday phenomenon.23
This failure to prevent looting extended even to churches: "Turkish
Cypriot leaders evidently felt little obligation to preserve Orthodox
churches, which many viewed as remnants of rulers who had oppressed
them. Over the next 10 years [following the invasion], Greek Cypriot offi-
cials say, the churches were looted of more than 20,000 religious arti-
facts. ,24 People living in the occupied zone reported to the Government of
Cyprus and the Church about the looting and destruction of churches and
18. Id. at 1378.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. For a discussion of the situation prior to the invasion and the treaty Turkey relied upon, see
Thomas Ehrlich, The Measuring Line of Occasion, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1050, 1052-54 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1969).
22. 717 F. Supp. at 1378.
23. KYPROS CHRYSOSTOMIDES, THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 186-87 (2000) (quoting REPORT OF
THE ECHR, Nos. 6780/74 & 6950/75, paras. 411-87, at 136-52).
24. Judith Miller & Stephen Kinzer, Greek Orthodox Church Icons Ravaged in the Turkish Pan of
Cyprus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1998, at A8.
20081 1077
Alabama Law Review
other national monuments, including the theft of "mosaics, frescos, and
icons."'
The Kanakaria Church is in the Turkish-held area of the island.26 By
1976, all Greek Cypriots in the village had vacated, fleeing to the Greek-
held south.27 Sometime between August 1976 and October 1979, the inte-
rior of the Kanakaria Church was vandalized and the mosaics were forci-
bly removed from the apse of the church.28 Judge Bauer in the appellate
decision provided the following account:
When the priests evacuated the Kanakaria Church in 1976, the
mosaic was still intact. In the late 1970s, however, Church of Cy-
prus officials received increasing reports that Greek Cypriot
churches and monuments in northern Cyprus were being attacked
and vandalized, their contents stolen or destroyed .... In Novem-
ber, 1979, a resident of northern Cyprus brought word to the Re-
public's Department of Antiquities that this fate had also befallen
the Kanakaria Church and its mosaic. Vandals had plundered the
church, removing anything of value from its interior. The mosaic,
or at least its most recognizable and valuable parts, had been forc-
ibly ripped from the apse of the church. Once a place of worship,
the Kanakaria Church had been reduced to a stable for farm ani-
mals.29
Turkish authorities in northern Cyprus purported to acquire all proper-
ty of persons who left the north if they left, owing to the invasion or in the
words of the decree: "'as a result of the situation after 20th July 1974.' 30
Turkish authorities also sought to acquire all religious buildings and antiq-
uities.3 The same authorities sought to intervene in Autocephalous to as-
sert title to the mosaics under these decrees.32
As soon as the Republic of Cyprus learned that the mosaics were no
longer in the Kanakaria Church, it contacted UNESCO, informing offi-
cials of the theft.33 UNESCO has special responsibility for protection of
25. 717 F. Supp. at 1379.
26. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 280 (7th Cir. 1990).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 280-81.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 291.
31. Id. at 291-92.
32. See id.
33. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
1374, 1380 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
1078 [Vol. 59:41075
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world cultural heritage.' Cyprus also notified other people and organiza-
tions that might help in the recovery of the mosaics.
In 1984, Peg Goldberg was the owner of an art gallery in Carmel, In-
diana, an affluent Indianapolis suburb.36 She went on a buying trip to the
Netherlands in the hope of purchasing impressionist paintings and other
more contemporary work.37 After an attempt to purchase a Modigliani fell
through, Robert Fitzgerald, another Indiana art dealer, introduced her to
his friend, Michael van Rijn, who claimed to be a descendant of Rem-
brandt van Rijn and Peter Paul Reubens.38 Van Rijn was also a known
felon, convicted in France for forging the signature of Marc Chagall on
prints of the artist's unsigned work.39 Apparently, this was known to
Goldberg, but she nevertheless entered into discussions with Fitzgerald
and Van Rijn to purchase four ancient mosaics from an "extinct" church
in northern Cyprus through a Turkish antiquities dealer, Aydin Dikman,
based in Munich.'
Goldberg was very keen about the possibility of the purchase and
quickly contacted her bank in Indianapolis. 4' She apparently did not, how-
ever, attempt to contact the Republic of Cyprus, the Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church, UNESCO, or the International Foundation for Art Re-
search (IFAR); nor did she take any steps to check the credentials of the
Turkish antiquities dealer.42 She did not seek to verify title.43 Instead, she
went to Geneva, where she met Mr. Dikman in the "free port" area of the
Geneva airport." She saw the mosaics and set about getting cash to pay
for them.45 She needed to wait a few days for the bank loan and says she
used the time to contact both UNESCO and IFAR.' In her call to
UNESCO, she "inquired as to whether any treaties prevented 'the removal
of items from northern Cyprus in the mid- to late-1970s to Germany,' but
did not mention the mosaics. "17 IFAR has no record of her call, nor of a
search she claims she requested regarding the mosaics. 4
34. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World
Heritage Centre-World Heritage, http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
35. 717 F. Supp. at 1380.
36. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 281 (7th Cir. 1990).
37. Id.
38. 717 F. Supp. at 1381 & n.4.
39. Id. at 1381.
40. 917 F.2d at 281-82.
41. See id. at 282.
42. See id. at 283.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 282.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 282-83.
47. Id. at 283.
48. Id.
2008] 1079
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Goldberg soon received the requested loan of $1.2 million dollars
from her bank.4 9 Dikman had requested cash, so she brought two satchels
stuffed with $100 bills to the meeting.5" She kept $120,000 and gave the
remaining $1,080,000 to Fitzgerald in return for the mosaics and a
"[g]eneral bill of sale.""' Fitzgerald distributed the $1.08 million among
himself, Dikman, Van Rijn, and others.52 Goldberg returned to Indianapo-
lis the next day with the mosaics and deposited the remainder of the
$120,000 into several business and personal accounts in her name.53 She
then developed a brochure to re-sell the mosaics and began contacting
possible purchasers.54 It was her intention to sell them for a healthy prof-
it.55 Two of her contacts led her to Dr. Marion True of the Getty Museum
in Los Angeles.56 Upon hearing of the mosaics, True contacted the Repub-
lic of Cyprus, notifying officials of the offer she had received.57 It was
through True's information that the Republic of Cyprus and the Church of
Cyprus (hereinafter "Cyprus") finally located the mosaics in a suburb of
Indianapolis.58
Naturally, Cyprus asked Goldberg to return the mosaics and even of-
fered to reimburse the purchase price59 as provided for in the UNESCO
Convention.6 When she refused, Cyprus brought a replevin action in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.6" The TRNC
moved to be joined in the action as the true owners of the mosaics under
the confiscatory edicts described above.62 The Court refused to allow the
TRNC to join, owing mostly to the fact that at the time of the case only
Turkey had recognized it as the lawful government of northern Cyprus.63
49. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
1374, 1383 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 283 (7th Cir. 1990).
55. See id.
56. Id. while Judge Noland was complimentary of True, pointing out her apt name in the cir-
cumstances, at time of writing she is defending herself in Rome against criminal charges for illicit
acquisition of antiquities for the J. Paul Getty Museum. She also faces charges in Greece. Dalya Al-
berge, Getty Museum Gives Treasures Back to Greece, TIMES (London), Dec. 13, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 21545571; Hugh Eakin & Anthee Carassava, Getty Deal to Return Treasures to Greece,
INT'L HERALD TRiB., Dec. 12, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 21418113.
57. 917 F.2d at 283.
58. See id.
59. Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen Cultural Proper-
ty, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1177, 1180 (2005).
60. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(b)(ii).
61. 917 F.2d at 283-84.
62. William G. Pearlstein, Claims for the Repatriation of Cultural Property: Prospects for a
Managed Antiquities Market, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 123, 138 (1996).
63. Id.
1080 [Vol. 59:4:1075
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Then, after doing a thorough analysis of Indiana law, Judge Noland
awarded possession of the Kanakaria mosaics to Cyprus.(4 Goldberg had
argued Swiss law applied, in the evident hope that she could prove she
was a good faith purchaser.65 Such purchasers may obtain title even from a
thief in Switzerland.' Indiana has the opposite rule.67 The court found the
contacts in the case more substantial with Indiana than Switzerland, 6 how-
ever, and held that Goldberg never acquired good title to the mosaics.'
The court also considered in the alternative that, even under Swiss law,
Goldberg did not have good title, as she was hardly a good faith purchas-
er. 
70
Goldberg appealed. 71 The Seventh Circuit considered a variety of is-
sues related to the case, but again, on the basis of Indiana law, it af-
firmed. 72 The Supreme Court denied certiorari and Goldberg finally
handed over the mosaics to the Church.73 The appellate court remon-
strated with Goldberg for failing to exercise due diligence in a transaction
where "'[a]ll the red flags are up, all the red lights are on, all the sirens
are blaring.'" ' As the Court observed, if Goldberg had pursued a full
search with the International Foundation for Art Research, a full back-
ground check of the seller, or a title search, she would have quickly dis-
covered the Church had "a valid, superior, and enforceable claim. "7 The
appellate court again weighed the contacts in the case, straining to find
more contacts to Indiana and, thus, a basis for applying Indiana law rather
than Swiss law.76 The appellate court also took up the issue of whether to
recognize the decrees through which the TRNC sought to claim title to the
mosaics.77 Instead of turning to the decisive rule of international law on
this question, the court considered only U.S. cases on the right of de facto
entities to appear in U.S. courts and post-Civil War cases dealing with
Confederate property decrees.7
Judge Cudahy in his concurrence did consider the contemporary inter-
national legal framework that protects cultural property in time of war and
64. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
1374, 1395-1400 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
65. See id. at 1400.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1399 n.22
68. Id. at 1393-95.
69. Id. at 1398-99.
70. Id. at 1400-04.
71. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 279 (7th Cir. 1990).
72. See id. at 293-94.
73. See 502 U.S. 941 (1991).
74. 917 F.2d at 294 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Vikan).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 286-87.
77. Id. at 291-93.
78. See id.
2008] 1081
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occupation, though he agreed Indiana law governed the case. 79 He thought
the 1954 Hague Convention "may" apply.' Judge Cudahy noted that "the
Cypriot mosaics would be considered cultural property [under the Conven-
tion] warranting international protection." 8 He pointed out that the 1954
Hague Convention was applicable in the cases of invasion and occupation
such as Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus in 1974 and the Unit-
ed State's ongoing refusal to recognize the government it established in
northern Cyprus. 2 The Hague Convention "prohibits the destruction or
seizure of cultural property during armed conflict, whether international or
civil in nature, and during periods of belligerent occupation." 3 In addi-
tion, the Hague Convention prohibits international trafficking in cultural
property illegally seized during armed conflict or occupation.' Judge Cu-
dahy viewed the TRNC's attempt to divest the Greek Cypriot Church of
ownership in the mosaics as "interference of the sort contemplated by the
1954 Hague Convention."" Thus, the acts and decrees of the northern
Cyprus government in attempting to divest the Greek Cypriot Church of
title were without legal effect. 6
Judge Cudahy also discussed Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention,
which requires states "to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen
from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar insti-
tution in another State Party .... "87 He did not believe the UNESCO
Convention applied directly to the case because the U.S. implementing
79. See id. at 294-97 (Cudahy, J., concurring). It appears that the relevant international law was
briefed in the case given that Judge Cudahy was aware of it. It is not known, however, whether the
lawyers for Cyprus actually argued it should be the law of decision as opposed to supplementary
supporting authority.
80. Id. at 295-96.
81. Id. at 295. The 1954 Hague Convention defines cultural property in Article 1:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "cultural property" shall cover, irres-
pective of origin or ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of
every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or
secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical
or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, his-
torical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collec-
tions of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable
cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and
depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed con-
flict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs
(a) and (b), to be known as "centres containing monuments".
1954 Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 1.
82. 917 F.2d at 295-96.
83. Id. at 296.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 7) (alteration in original).
1082
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legislation, the Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983 (CPIA), has
an effective date after the mosaics were stolen. 8  He also noted that the
CPIA focuses on customs laws and not the type of replevin action in tort
law at issue.89
While Judge Cudahy was correct that the CPIA could not be applied
directly in the case, other international law did apply. First, Turkey and
Cyprus are parties to the 1954 Hague Convention and were parties at the
time of the invasion.' ° As a party, Turkey is bound under Article 18(1) of
the Convention to apply the Convention with respect to another high con-
tracting party.9 The Convention requires in Article 4(3) that parties "pro-
hibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or
misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural
property."' The right choice of law, therefore, was the Convention in
order to determine whether the mosaics could be lawfully acquired by
anyone without the Church's permission. Under the Convention, they
could not. The fact that the United States has signed but not ratified the
Convention is not relevant to a choice-of-law decision.93 The right choice
of law is the law most applicable to the case.' The court considered apply-
ing Swiss law,95 which is not at all part of the law of the United States but
might have been applicable on other facts. The court faced no legal impe-
diment to applying the Hague Convention as the proper law of the case.
Even if the court decided it was United States law that should apply in
the case and not the 1954 Hague Convention per se, international law is
part of U.S. law. The primary forms of international law are treaties, cus-
tomary international law, and general principles of law.96 Customary in-
ternational law, which is proven through evidence of a general practice
followed out of a sense of legal obligation, includes rules for the protec-
tion of cultural property in time of armed conflict and occupation.' In-
88. Id. at 296-97.
89. Id. at 297.
90. Turkey became a party in 1965 and Cyprus in 1964. See UNESCO, List of Signatories to the
1954 Hague Convention, http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (last
visited Mar. 10, 2008).
91. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 18(1).
92. Id. art. 4(3).
93. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 18(3).
94. See Annette Kur, Applicable Law: An Alternative Proposal for International Regulation, 30
BROOK. J. INr'L L. 951, 952 (2005).
95. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
1374, 1394-95 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cit. 1990).
96. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [he-
reinafter Statute of the International Court of Justice].
97. In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) restated the relevant customary
law principles as:
Rule 40. Each party to the conflict must protect cultural property:
108320081
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deed, it is generally acknowledged that the 1954 Hague Convention is
largely customary international law; certainly Article 4 is. This conclusion
is based not only on the widespread support for the Convention but other
evidence of state practice in support of similar rules in the 1970 UNESCO
Convention98 and the 1907 Hague Regulations." Both treaties, like the
1954 Hague Convention, restrict acquiring and trafficking in cultural
property in armed conflict and occupation. These three treaties, together
with other state practice, form a clear rule of customary international law
that should have been applied to protect transfer of title in the mosaics to
any party other than the Church.
The United States helped move the 1954 Hague Convention to custo-
mary law status. First, it has signed the Convention and stated it plans to
join.t ° Second, it has stated officially that it is generally bound by the
customary international law obligation to protect cultural property.1"'
A. All seizure of or destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to re-
ligion, charity, education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art
and science is prohibited.
B. Any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism di-
rected against, property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people is
prohibited.
Rule 41. The occupying power must prevent the illicit export of cultural property from oc-
cupied territory and must return illicitly exported property to the competent authorities of
the occupied territory.
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 132, 135 (2005); see also Jan Hladik, The 1954 Hague Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Notion of Military Necessity, 835
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 621 (1999), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JQ39; John C. Johnson, Under New Management:
The Obligation to Protect Cultural Property During Military Occupation, 190/191 MIL. L. REV. 111,
125, 129 (2006/2007); David A. Meyer, Note, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and its
Emergence into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349, 387-89 (1993). For an article-
by-article assessment of the 1954 Convention and its two Protocols, see KEVIN CHAMBERLAIN, WAR
AND CULTURAL HERITAGE (2004).
98. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 7.
99. Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 10.
100. James A. R. Nafziger, Protection of Cultural Heritage in Time of War and its Aftermath,
IFAR J., http://www.ifar.org/heritage.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
101. "The United States considers the obligations to protect natural, civilian, and cultural property
to be customary international law." OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEF., JANUARY 1993
REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TO CONGRESS ON
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF NATURAL AND
CULTURAL RESOURCES DURING TIMES OF WAR, reprinted in PATRICK J. BOYLAN, REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT
(THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1954) app. VIII, at 201, 202 (1993), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/00100l/l00l59eo.pdf. Apparently, in 1994, U.S. State and
Defense Department lawyers reviewed the Convention and supported its submission to the Senate for
advice and consent. See id. According to Parks, however, it was not submitted at that time owing to a
shortage of experts to prepare the submission. See Hays Parks, Protection of Cultural Property From
the Effects of War, in THE LAW OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AND NATURAL HERITAGE: PROTECTION,
TRANSFER AND ACCESS 3-1, 3-24 (Marilyn Phelan ed., 1998).
In addition to this recognition that provisions of the treaty are part of customary international
law, the United States has duties as a signatory to the Convention. Treaty signers have duties not to
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, pending its coming into force. Vienna Convention on the
1084
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The UNESCO Convention provides additional evidence that the rule
against trafficking in cultural property illegally seized in a zone of occupa-
tion is customary international law. Judge Cudahy cited Article 7 of the
Convention that requires states to take appropriate steps to recover and
return protected property when requested to do so by states party such as
Cyprus."° In addition, the UNESCO Convention requires in Article 11:
"The export and transfer of ownership of cultural property under compul-
sion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country by a
foreign power shall be regarded as illicit."' 3 As Judge Cudahy noted, the
United States has ratified the UNESCO Convention and implemented it in
the Cultural Property Implementation Act."° The Convention's Articles 7
and 9 require concerted action among nations to prevent trade in specific
items of cultural property in emergency situations, such as situations of
occupation." The UNESCO Convention complements the 1954 Hague
Convention by focusing on trafficking in cultural property during peace-
time, imposing a "moral imperative to protect" humanity's treasures."
The U.S. implementing legislation, the CPIA, provides further sup-
port for the conclusion here that a firm rule of customary international law
was in place. As Judge Cudahy pointed out, the policy embodied in the
CPIA is clear:
at the very least, we should not sanction illegal traffic in stolen
cultural property [such as the mosaics] that [are] clearly docu-
mented as belonging to a public or religious institution. This is
particularly true where this sort of property is "important to the
cultural heritage of a people because of its distinctive characteris-
tics, comparative rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the
origins, development, or history of that people. "107
The Judge could also have looked to another important source of law
on occupation: The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 to which the United
Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
102. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text; see also UNESCO Convention, supra note 9,
art. 7, at 240. Cyprus became a party in 1979, Turkey in 1981, and the United States in 1983. See
UNESCO, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property: List of State Parties,
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/htmleng/page3.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
103. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, art. 11; see also Johnson, supra note 97, at 136.
104. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (2000).
105. UNESCO Convention, supra note 9, arts. 7, 9.
106. Michele Kunitz, Comment, Switzerland & the International Trade in Art & Antiquities, 21
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 519, 528 (2001).
107. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 297 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(C)(ii)(II) (2000)).
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States is also a party."°8 It includes an annex of regulations on land war-
fare. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations requires:
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to re-
ligion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when
State property, shall be treated as private property.
All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of
this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings."0
"Should be made the subject of legal proceedings" refers to all parties to
the Hague Regulations, which includes the United States. In this obliga-
tion, and more generally, Article 56 provides support for the rule against
acquiring and trafficking in a zone of occupation. Other examples of state
practice provide additional evidence of a rule of customary law: Iraq was
forced to return Kuwaiti cultural property in the wake of its illegal inva-
sion in 1990-1991." t° The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia has also stressed the importance of cultural property protection
in the event of armed conflict.'11
Given the existence of a firm rule of customary international law
against trafficking, the judges in this case should have applied it. In the
words of the Supreme Court in the famous Paquete Habana case: "Inter-
national law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."112 In
that case, property was acquired by the United States Navy at the time of
the war with Spain in 1898.3 The property at issue there was fishing
boats.1 4 Fishing boats, like cultural property today, were exempt from
seizure in wartime." 5 The Navy had to return the proceeds of the sale of
the boats to the private owners.16
108. See Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 10.
109. See id. art. 56.
110. See Victoria A. Birov, Note, Prize or Plunder?: The Pillage of Works of Art and the Interna-
tional Law of War, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201, 226 (1997-98).
111. See id. at 226-27.
112. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 734 (2004). For an excellent analysis of the Paquete Habana decision that responds to some
recent misreadings of the case, see William S. Dodge, The Paquete Habana: Customary International
Law as Part of Our Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORS 175 (John E. Noyes et al eds., 2007).
113. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 678-79.
114. Id. at 678.
115. Id. at 707.
116. Id. at 714.
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In another relevant Supreme Court case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 7 a U.S. national tried to prove that international law pre-
vented an American buyer from taking title to a shipment of sugar from
Cuba.' The Court's majority could not find a clear rule of customary
international law superior to the otherwise applicable Cuban nationaliza-
tion decree that purported to transfer ownership of the sugar." 9 The Court
feared that ascertaining the law in a case such as Sabbatino could interfere
with executive branch participation in international law-making.'20 Justice
White, in dissent, had no doubt that the Court could and should determine
what the international law on the subject of expropriation required. He
wrote:
This Court has time and again effectuated the clear understanding
of the Framers, as embodied in the Constitution, by applying the
law of nations to resolve cases and controversies. As stated in The
Paquete Habana "international law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination." Principles of international
law have been applied in our courts to resolve controversies not
merely because they provide a convenient rule for decision but be-
cause they represent a consensus among civilized nations on the
proper ordering of relations between nations and the citizens the-
reof. Fundamental fairness to litigants as well as the interest in
stability of relationships and preservation of reasonable expecta-
tions call for their application whenever international law is con-
trolling in a case or controversy.12
Congress subsequently gave express jurisdiction to the federal courts
and a cause of action to plaintiffs in cases where a foreign sovereign state
allegedly takes property in violation of international law.' 22 This is exactly
the cause of action in the next case to be discussed, Republic of Austria v.
Altmann.'23
In the case of the mosaics, where a clear rule of international law pre-
vented transfer of title in a case, the rule should have been applied. The
lingering question from the Autocephalous case is why only Judge Cudahy
117. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
118. Id. at 416-39.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 428-33.
121. Id. at 451-53 (White, J. dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (footnotes omit-
ted).
122. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2000).
123. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
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looked at the relevant international law. The other three judges had to
stretch the facts in order to apply Indiana law. The facts naturally fit with-
in the international law governing occupation. As international law and
Indiana law had the same result in this case, some may believe it unimpor-
tant to raise the issue of failing to apply international law, but it is always
important for judges to apply the proper law of a case. Moreover, apply-
ing international law would have provided a helpful precedent for the
many future cases likely to present themselves to U.S. courts from the war
in Iraq and other wars and occupations where looting of precious art and
antiquities, sadly, continues. 24
FIVE KLIMTS FROM THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL GALLERY
The next story concerns five paintings by the great Viennese artist
Gustav Klimt. The paintings hung on public display for fifty-five years in
the Austrian National Gallery (the Belvedere) in Vienna.'25 Today, one of
the paintings hangs in a small private museum on Manhattan's Upper East
Side; the other four were sold at auction in November 2006, for record
sums and are in private hands. 126 This outcome is due in part to a 2004
United States Supreme Court decision on a major doctrine of international
law, the immunity of sovereign states from national court process. 127 The
Court reached its decision by interpreting a U.S. statute without assessing
the relevant international law the statute was intended to implement. 128
The paintings at the center of this story were all made between 1903
and 1915.129 Two are portraits of Adele Bloch-Bauer, including Adele
Bloch-Bauer 1 (1907), which is considered one of Klimt's finest works,
perhaps second only to The Kiss.3 ° Like The Kiss, Adele Bloch-Bauer I
features glittering gold and other rich hues inspired by Klimt's visit made
in 1903 to Ravenna, Italy, to see the extraordinary Byzantine mosaics
there.13' The visit is described in a brochure prepared for a special exhibit
124. See infra notes 220-261 and accompanying text.
125. The five paintings are Adele Bloch-Bauer I, Adele Bloch-Bauer II, Apfelbaum, Buchen-
wald/Birkenwald, Hduser in Unterach am Attersee. This and other factual information is found in the
Austrian arbitral award. Altmann v. Austria (U.S. v. Austria) 1 (2006) (on file with the Alabama Law
Review) [hereinafter Arbitral Award]; see also Brief for Petitioners at 5, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (No.
03-13), 2003 WL 22766740.
126. See Klimt Crowns Record Art Auction, BBC NEWS, Nov. 9, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6131520.stm; Souren Melikian, Auction Sets $491 Million
Record, INT'L HERALD TRtB., Nov. 10, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 19551085; Souren Melikian,
How Christie's Kept Top Spot Over Sotheby's in 2006 Sales, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 13, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 763090.
127. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 677.
128. Id. at 688-702.
129. See Neue Galerie: Museum for German and Austrian Art, Brochure for "Gustav Klint: Five
Paintings from the Collection of Ferdinand and Adele Bloch-Bauer," July 13-Sept. 18, 2006.
130. See id.
131. See id.
1088 [Vol. 59:4:1075
Stories of Art, War, and Greed
to show the five paintings together'3 2 for possibly the last time before be-
ing sold at auction. The brochure says that Klimt was impressed at Raven-
na especially by the figure of the Empress Theodora, whose portrait fea-
tures jewels and inlaid gold.133 When he "retum[ed] to Vienna, he began
to work [on] what became known as his 'Golden Style,' incorporating gold
elements in both his allegorical and portrait paintings."'" In Adele Bloch-
Bauer I,
gold is used in a variety of contexts, from the lustrous background
to the shining fabric of Adele's gown. The subject seems to be-
come one with her glowing surroundings, yet a distinctive and
tenderly drawn figure emerges from the profusion of decorative
motifs. Adele appears as a modem, complex woman, her intelli-
gence as evident as her sensuality.'35
The description seems consistent with the rumor that Adele Bloch-
Bauer had had an affair with Gustav Klimt. 36 She met him before she
married and may have posed secretly for him in his famous Judith series
of a beautiful, semi-clad woman.'37 At any rate, Adele's family arranged a
marriage for her to Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, a wealthy Jewish industrialist
in Vienna at the turn of the last century.'38 She became part of Viennese
society, renowned for its focus on art, literature, philosophy, and the
sciences.' 39 Her husband was a patron of the arts and apparently commis-
sioned, among other paintings, the two portraits of his wife." 
In 1925, Adele died of meningitis at age 43.141 She and Ferdinand had
no children. 142 Her will, written in 1923, designated her husband as her
principal heir and requested that he donate six Klimt paintings, including
the two portraits and four landscapes, to the Austrian National Gallery
upon his death. 143 A translation of the exact request reads, "'I ask my hus-
band after his death to leave my two portraits and the four landscapes by
Gustav Klimt to the Austrian State Gallery in Vienna . "...",,44 Ferdi-
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See FRANK WHrrFoRD, KLiMT 12 (1990).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 12, 16.
140. See id. at 9; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 681 (2004).
141. Michael Kimmelman, Klimt Sale: The Road Not Taken by Heirs, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Sept.
20, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 16317171.
142. WHrFORD, supra note 136, at 12.
143. Arbitral Award, supra note 125, at 3.
144. Id.
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nand's brother Gustav settled the estate. 145 He made a statement to the
probate court that the paintings were not Adele's property, but his broth-
er's." Nevertheless, he added that his brother would carry out his wife's
wishes. 147 Notice to this effect was sent to the Austrian Gallery.'48 In 1936,
Ferdinand did transfer one of the Klimt paintings designated in Adele's
will to the Austrian Gallery. 1
49
In 1938, "Germany invaded, occupied and claimed to annex Austria,
in what became known as the Anschluss." 15 ° As a Jew and someone who
had opposed the Anschluss, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer decided to leave Aus-
tria the same year in 1938, first for Prague, then Zurich.' Soon after his
departure, tax authorities began proceedings against him under laws com-
monly used by the Nazis against Jews to acquire their property.'52 The
remaining Klimt paintings mentioned in Adele's will and other art works
were seized to pay the tax penalty.' 53 A Dr. Fiihrer was assigned to liqui-
date the Bloch-Bauer estate in order to pay the tax penalty.' 54 With respect
to the five Klimts,
Dr. Fihrer gave the paintings Adele Bloch-Bauer I and Apfelbaum
I to the gallery, which in turn gave him Schloss Kammer am Atter-
see III, which Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer had given to the gallery in
1936 in fulfillment of his promise made as part of the probate pro-
ceedings. Dr. Fiihrer subsequently sold the latter painting for
6,000 Reichsmark to Gustav Ucicky, a son of Gustav Klimt. In
1942 Dr. Fiirer sold and surrendered Buchenwald (Birkenwald)
for 5,000 Reichsmark to the City of Vienna Collection. In 1943,
Dr. Fihrer sold Adele Bloch-Bauer II to the Austrian Gallery
(known as the Modem Gallery at that time), and kept Hiduser in
Unterach am Attersee for himself. 155
Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer changed his will shortly before his death in
1945 in Zurich, leaving all his property in unequal shares to three of his
brother's five children.'56 The largest share went to the oldest daughter
with smaller amounts to a son, Robert, who changed his last name to
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id.
147. Id. It is not clear who paid for the paintings. Austria has argued that Adele did. See id. at 6-7.
148. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 125, at 6.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Arbitral Award, supra note 125, at 4.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 4-6.
1090 [Vol. 59:4:1075
Stories of Art, War, and Greed
Bentley, and a younger daughter, Maria Altmann. (Apparently two other
sons, Karl and Leopold, were not included.)' Altmann had left Austria
with her husband in 1938, shortly after his release from detention in the
Dachau concentration camp in Germany. 158 The Altmanns settled in Cali-
fornia, where Maria became a citizen in 1945.159 In that same year, Ferdi-
nand hired a lawyer, Dr. Rinesch, to represent him in seeking restitution
of his property.)" After Ferdinand died, Rinesch continued to represent
the family.' 61 He succeeded in re-acquiring a great many assets, but
reached an agreement with officials to forego any claim to the five Klimts
in exchange for permission to export other property.'62
The paintings hung in the Austrian National Gallery from 1948 until
1999.163 Then, in 1999, an Austrian journalist wrote an article in which he
raised doubts about whether the Austrian Gallery had good title to the
paintings."6 He argued that the deal made with Rinesch had been fraudu-
lent'65 and brought the matter to the attention of Maria Altmann, who
wrote to the Gallery claiming title to the paintings.' The case first went
to a commission in Austria. 67 Altmann was joined at the commission hear-
ings by two other Bloch-Bauer heirs. 68 The commission decided that as a
result of Adele's will, Ferdinand's promise, and/or Rinesch's agreement,
the Austrian Gallery had title to the five Klimts.169 At this point the other
heirs dropped out of the case, but Altmann sought to bring suit on the mat-
ter in Austrian courts. 7° Under Austrian procedural rules, she was re-
quired to post a bond for a percentage of the value of the paintings.' 7' In
1999, the five paintings were together estimated to be worth $150 million
dollars.' 72 An Austrian court, however, lowered the amount of the bond to
$350,000, but Austria appealed the decision. 73 At that point, Altmann
decided to sue in the United States. 1
74
157. Id.
158. See Josh Kun, The Art of Memory: How an Obsessed Brentwood Lawyer Reunited the Most
Expensive Painting in the World with its Nonagenarian Los Angeles Heir, L.A. MAG., Oct. 1, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 21455895.
159. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 681 (2004).
160. See Arbitral Award, supra note 125, at 5.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 125, at 5-9.
164. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 684.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 125, at 5-9.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 684.
171. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002), af4'd, 541 U.S. 677
(2004).
172. See Altnann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
173. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 685.
174. Id.
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In the United States, however, Mrs. Altmann was immediately con-
fronted with the problem of foreign sovereign immunity as her suit was
against the Republic of Austria and the Austrian National Gallery, a state
institution. Under the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, she might
have had an exception for immunity under the same provisions of the Act
already discussed above with respect to the Sabbatino case, property ex-
propriation by the state in violation of international law. 17' Altmann argued
that Austria had acquired the paintings in violation of the 1907 Hague
Regulations, in particular, Article 56's protection of cultural property dur-
ing occupation, 176 the same provision discussed above in the mosaics
case. 177 But this exception for expropriation of property and cause of ac-
tion were created in 1976.178 Her claim concerned actions of a foreign
sovereign between 1938 and 1948, when states enjoyed absolute immunity
from process in national courts. 179 In other words, there were no excep-
tions for private suits. Disputes of this kind had to be adopted by an indi-
vidual's state of nationality and settled through negotiation or brought in
an international court or tribunal. 8° In a surprising decision, however, the
Federal District Court in Los Angeles lifted the immunity of Austria re-
troactive to 1948.181 Austria appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but the appeals
court affirmed the lower court decision, though on slightly different
grounds.'82 Austria then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari, and, in a 6-3 decision, affirmed the District
Court decision to make the exception to immunity for expropriation of
property in violation of international law in the 1976 Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act retroactive to 1948.183
The case raises interesting domestic law questions, such as why the
court felt it merited overriding the presumption against retroactive applica-
tion of statutes,"8 but of interest here is the fact that six U.S. Supreme
Court Justices did not consider what international law says about the re-
troactive application of an exception to sovereign immunity, a doctrine of
175. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
176. Brief for Respondent at 4, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (No. 03-13), 2003 WL 23002713.
177. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
178. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 691.
179. See id. at 688.
180. This is what the United States did for example with respect to American claims of expropria-
tion of property by the Soviets. In 1937, the United States agreed in the Litvinov Assignment to offset
American claims against the Soviet government with those of Soviet nationals. See, e.g., United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937). Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion doubts that the United
States could have represented Altmann against Austria because she failed to exhaust remedies in Aus-
tria. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 714.
181. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1197-1201 (C.D. Cal. 2001), afftd,
317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
182. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 687-88.
183. Id. at 679, 688.
184. There may be an indication from Justice Stevens's re-telling of the facts, which suggests great
sympathy for the respondent. See id. at 680-85.
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international law. 185 Even the dissenters, who objected to the retroactive
application of the law, Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Thomas, failed to
look to international law despite the fact it supported their position.' 6 In a
strongly-worded dissent, they spoke against undermining the rule on re-
troactivity, restated that statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless
it is clear that is what Congress intended, and invoked the policy implica-
tions of disturbing international relations through altering a settled doc-
trine. 87 They failed to look, however, to the applicable international law,
which included a rule of absolute immunity until the 1950s and embraces
today a general principle against the retroactive application of law.'i8
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, begins by considering
whether sovereign immunity is a matter of procedural or substantive
law. '9 As substantive law, the provisions of the FSIA should not be ap-
plied retroactively absent clear Congressional intent."9° Justice Stevens
finds no clear intent, but concludes that the FSIA defies categorization as
either substantive or procedural.' He decides, therefore, to create a new
test for retroactive application of the law for the case, on the basis that the
presumption against retroactive application of law can be relaxed where
private rights are not involved. 192 Then, implying from a few aspects of
the FSIA and Congressional purposes for adopting the Act, he decides the
FSIA can be made applicable to 1948.'9'
V6zquez is critical of Stevens's approach."' 4 First, he explains that the
FSIA is both procedural and substantive.' 95 As a jurisdiction-conferring
statute that increases the burden on a party, it falls under the rule of
Hughes Aircraft'" and should not be applied retroactively." 7 Vjzquez
points out that Stevens is in error when he de-emphasizes the burden on
states created by lifting immunity:
While recognizing that Hughes Aircraft supported characterization
of the immunity as substantive, the majority attempted in a foot-
185. See id. at 688-702.
186. See id. at 715-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 715.
188. Again, as in the mosaics case, the lawyers may not have briefed the court on what internation-
al law required. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 125; see also supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text.
189. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 692-700.
190. See id. at 692-94.
191. Id. at 694.
192. Id. at 694-97.
193. Id. at 697-700.
194. See Carlos M. Vdzquez, Altmann v. Austria and the Retroactivity of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 207 (2005).
195. See id. at 211-19.
196. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1997).
197. Vd7quez, supra note 194, at 213.
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note to distinguish the statute in Hughes Aircraft on the ground
that it prescribed a jurisdictional limitation that any court enter-
taining the cause of action was bound to apply. Suits against for-
eign states barred from the state and federal courts by the FSIA,
on the other hand, could still be entertained in foreign courts. The
availability of foreign courts, in the majority's view, made the
FSIA more like the jurisdictional rules characterized in Landgraf
as procedural because they determine which court may entertain an
action, rather than whether the action may be maintained at all.
The Majority overlooked the fact that the FSIA purported to be
largely a codification of international law principles of immunity,
applicable equally in all nations. To the extent that the FSIA did
codify existing international law, the conclusion that a suit was
barred by the FSIA would mean that the suit would be likewise
barred in the courts of other states (if those states complied with
their obligations under international law).' 98
Stevens gives no reason why sovereign immunity should not be treated
as substantive per Hughes.' Vdzquez also points out that the congression-
al purpose in adopting the FSIA would be better met if courts applied the
international law on sovereign immunity at the time of the state's con-
duct.2 "° The majority should have read the FSIA as requiring courts to
decide sovereign immunity claims "by applying the general principles of
sovereign immunity recognized by the United States at the time at which
the cause of action arose. "201
Part of Stevens' apparent reason for relaxing the anti-retroactivity pre-
sumption in the case of sovereign immunity appears to be his view that
sovereign immunity is only part of international comity and not a rule of
international law. 2' He looks back to the venerable Schooner Exchange
case of 1812 for the proposition that "sovereign immunity is a matter of
grace and comity," not law.2 3 He fails to note that under international law
absolute sovereign immunity had ripened into a rule of "customary inter-
national law by the late 19th century, and clearly had that status by the
early 20t1 century."' It only began to evolve toward restricted immunity
in the 1950s, and the exception for expropriation came later still. 205 Aus-
198. Id. at 214 (footnotes omitted).
199. See id.
200. Id. at 221.
201. Id.
202. See Republic of Austria v. Altnann, 541 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2004).
203. Id.
204. ViWzuez, supra note 194, at 212.
205. See id. at 212-13.
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tria, therefore, would have had absolute immunity from U.S. courts under
international law for acts performed in 1938-1948.206 Moreover, interna-
tional law today includes a general principle against the retroactive appli-
cation of law. 207 That principle was the critical one to apply in a case on
the international law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The dissenters argue against lifting Austria's immunity but only on the
basis of U.S. rules and policies against non-retroactivity and not on the
basis of what international law requires. 28 This failure to look to interna-
tional law is difficult to understand in the sovereign immunity area. In one
of the first decisions following the adoption of the FSIA, the Texas Trad-
ing case, Judge Kaufman explained that Congress intended the courts to
fill in the rather simple text of the FSIA by looking to the legislative histo-
ry of the Act and international law:
The legislative history states that the Act "incorporates standards
recognized under international law," House Report at 6613, and
the drafters seem to have intended rather generally to bring Amer-
206. The appellate court concluded that the State Department would not have indicated to the courts
in 1948 that Austria should enjoy this immunity. Altnann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965
(9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). But as the Supreme Court says, this conclusion is highly
speculative and does not change the evidence as to what immunity Austria could claim under interna-
tional law. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700-02; see also id. at 716-17 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing
the State Department's view that the expropriation was new at the time the FSIA was adopted).
207. General principles of law are the third primary source of international law. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, supra note 96, art. 38(1). International law includes a general principle
of law against the retroactive application of new law to past acts. Giving retroactive effect to law is
.contrary to general principles of international law." Multiplex v. Croatia, App. No. 58112/00, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2002) (unpublished decision), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr (follow "case-law"
hyperlink to "HUDOC" database; search "Decisions" and "Judgments" for "Application Number
58112/00"; then follow link #3). There is a "general principle of international law found in the Vienna
Convention, which establishes a presumption against the retroactive effect of treaties." Canada-Term
of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/AB/R (2000), 71. The Vienna Convention restates this general prin-
ciple with respect to treaties in Article 28:
Non-retroactivity of treaties Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is other-
wise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took
place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the
treaty with respect to that party.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. In two recent
national court decisions Italian and Greek courts ruled that an exception to sovereign immunity could
be applied retroactively in the case of a violation of a jus cogens norm. See Lorna McGregor, State
Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437, 439-40 (2006) (discussing Ferrini v Federal
Republic of Germany (Cass Sez UN 5044/04); Prefecture of Voiotia v FRG, Case No. 11/2000,
Areios Pagos). These decisions underscore that in cases not involving jus cogens violations the prin-
ciple against retroactivity applies. The expropriation of property in violation of international law is not
considered a jus cogens violation. Further, Justice Breyer cites four jurisdictions that expressly men-
tion that restrictive sovereign immunity legislation does not apply retroactively. Altmann, 541 U.S. at
708 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer does not, however, point to these laws as indicating what
international law requires, but only to suggest the United States should also have added such an ex-
press statement to the FSIA. See id. Such a statement was not necessary given that the FSIA codified
the international law on the subject, which incorporates the non-retroactivity principle.
208. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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ican sovereign immunity practice into line with that of other na-
tions. See 1976 Hearings at 25 (testimony of Monroe Leigh), 32
(testimony of Bruno A. Ristau); 1973 hearings at 18 (testimony of
Charles N. Brower). At this point, there can be little doubt that in-
ternational law follows the restrictive theory of sovereign immuni-
ty. House Report at 6613. See, e.g, State Immunity Act, 1978, s.
3 (United Kingdom); council of Europe, European Convention on
State Immunity, art. 4 (1972), reprinted in 1976 Hearings at 37,
38; Empire of Iran, 45 I.L.R. 57 (1963) (West Germany). 2'
In addition to this specific directive by the Congress to look to interna-
tional law, Altmann has multiple other references to international law,
including the very exception to sovereign immunity that Altmann claimed
under the FSIA, § 1605(a)(3): expropriation "in violation of international
law. "210 Altmann knew she had to find international law against the taking
of the paintings that was in existence during the Second World War. She
relied on the Hague Regulations of 1907, discussed above in the mosaics
case, in particular, Article 56, "'All seizure of. . . works of art . . . is
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings."'21' In
other words, she looked back to the relevant international law on acquiring
art in wartime as of the time of the events. The dissent does look to U.S.
cases indicating that the international law at the time of the events would
have afforded Austria immunity for alleged expropriation."' What the
dissent does not do, however, is look to what international law in 2004
required respecting retroactive application of the restrictive immunity rule.
No international law authorities are cited.
Upon losing the case and facing litigation on the merits of the claim in
U.S. courts, Austria offered final, binding arbitration in Austria.213 Alt-
mann and other heirs of Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer agreed.2"4 Austria lost the
arbitration owing essentially to the weight the three (male) arbitrators put
on the statement by Gustav Bloch-Bauer that Ferdinand, not Adele, owned
the paintings.2"5 They agreed that in cases where there is doubt as to
whether a married woman owns property, the law of the 1920s required
erring on the side of the husband's ownership.216 Upon receiving the
209. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir.
1981) (citations omitted).
210. Brief for Respondent, supra note 176, at 17.
211. Id. at 4 (citing Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 10, art. 56). See also supra notes
108-111 and accompanying text for citations to Article 56 and discussion of the use of the Article in
the mosaics case.
212. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 726-27 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
213. See Felicia R. Lee, Arbitration Set for Case of Looted Art, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at E3.
214. See id.
215. See Arbitral Award, supra note 125, at 20-21.
216. See id. The arbitrators did not consider at any length Austria's arguments that Adele owned
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award, the heirs offered to sell the paintings back to Austria, but the Aus-
trian culture minister said the price was four times the annual budget of all
Austrian national museums.217 Altmann and the other heirs then sold Adele
Bloch-Bauer I to the cosmetics heir, Ronald Lauder, for the largest sum
ever paid for a painting at that time, $135 million.218 Lauder hung the
painting in his private gallery in New York City. 219 He staged a special
exhibition with the other four paintings before they were auctioned at
Christies in November, 2006 also for record sums to anonymous buy-
ers.
220
Given the outcome of the arbitration, it might not seem important that
the United States Supreme Court lifted the immunity of Austria retroac-
tively in the case without consulting current international law on the sub-
ject. Again, however, as in the case of the mosaics, courts should always
apply the proper law. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act seeks to
implement the customary international law of sovereign immunity. 22 Fail-
ing to consult that law was a failure to properly apply the statute as Con-
gress intended. Moreover, as explained by Justice White in his dissent in
Sabbatino, "[p]rinciples of international law have been applied in our
courts to resolve controversies not merely because they embody a conve-
nient rule for decision but because they represent a consensus among civi-
lized nations on the proper ordering of relations between nations and the
citizens thereof. ,222 Not to apply these principles puts the United States out
of step with the consensus of nations and may well put the United States in
violation of its international law obligations.
the paintings, including that she might have paid for them or that Ferdinand's gift in 1936 to the Aus-
trian Gallery indicated he considered himself bound. They did not consider Gustav's self-interest in
stating the paintings were his brother's property or any other reasons for the statement, such as a wish
to suppress the rumors of Adele's affair with Klimt, rumors that might have been fueled had she
owned six of his paintings at her death. Nor did they consider the principle of the relevant Austrian
property law that personal items, such as clothes and jewelry, were presumed to belong to even a
married woman.
217. See Emily Sharpe & Jason Edward Kaufman, Lauder Raises $190m Cash as Bloch-Bauer
Klimts Come Up for Sale, ART NEWSPAPER, available at
http:I/theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?id=460 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
218. Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for a Klimzt Portrait, N.Y.TIMEs, June 19,
2006, at Bl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/19/arts/design/19klim.htnl?scp= 1&sq =Lauder +pays + %24135 +
million&st=nyt.
219. See id.
220. See id. Altmann and other heirs also successfully sued a Swiss bank in 2005 for other assets of
Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer. See William Glaberson, For Betrayal by Swiss Bank and Nazis, $21 Million,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at Al. They won $21 million, a record in World War 1-era claims
against Swiss Banks. Id.
221. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000).
222. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 453 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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A SUMERIAN KING FROM IRAQ223
The third story concerns the Entemena of Lagash, a statue created in
ancient Sumeria and estimated to be 4,400 years old.224 It was among
thousands of cultural objects looted in the aftermath of the U.S.-led inva-
sion of Iraq that began March 19, 2003 .225 The statue was one of the most
significant pieces to be taken from the Iraqi National Museum in Bagh-
dad.226 According to a 2006 New York Times article, the headless, Sume-
rian "king is dressed in a skirt of tasseled sheepskin and his arms are
crossed in prayer. Detailed inscriptions run along the figure's shoulder and
back."227 It "is among the most important artifacts unearthed in excava-
tions of Ur, an ancient southern city .... [I]t [is] not only archeologically
significant but also striking because the king's muscular arms were sculp-
tured in a lively, naturalistic style. Earlier sculptural styles were cruder.
g,228
The diorite statue was recovered in the summer of 2006 in a clandes-
tine operation that the United States has declined to discuss in detail. 229 It
is known that the statue was first taken out of the Baghdad Museum and
brought to Syria where it was put on sale in the international art market.23°
It was apparently recovered through the combined efforts of international
smugglers, an antiquities dealer named Hicham Aboutaam, and an "Iraqi
expatriate businessman" who brokered the deal. 231' Those privy to the de-
tails of this particular theft say that "[e]fforts to sell the statue began not
long after it was stolen.,, 232 Aboutaam was approached while visiting Leb-
anon and shown a picture of the Entemena statue. 2"I Those holding the
statue were seeking millions for it but when Aboutaam discovered "it had
been stolen[, he] did not pursue the deal." 234 He did, apparently, inform
223. This story draws on Mary Ellen O'Connell with Maria Alveras-Chen, Rethinking the Remedy
of Return in International Art Law, in THE ACQUISITION AND ExHIBITION OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITIES
95 (Robin F. Rhodes ed., 2007).
224. Barry Meier & James Glanz, U.S. Helps Recover Statue and Gives It Back to Iraqis,
N.Y.TIMES, July 26, 2006, at A12.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Repatriates Historical Artifact to the
Iraqi People (July 25, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/69504.htm.
228. Meier & Glanz, supra note 224.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Id.; see also Mike Boehm, Baghdad Museum's Sad Fate 'Bleeds My Heart,' L.A. TIMES, Oct.
2, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 19247877; Barry Meier & James Glanz, Piece from Looted Mu-
seum Returned-Headless Statue Had Been Taken to Syria, Put on Sale on International Antiquities
Market, HOUSTON CHRON., July 30, 2006, at A25, available at 2006 WLNR 13164178.
233. Meier & Glanz, supra note 224.
234. See id.
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U.S. authorities about the offer, however.235 At some later point, the FBI
asked him for his assistance in recovering the statue, and he, in turn, was
able to obtain the assistance of a mysterious businessman, who "began to
shuttle among Iraq, Syria and other countries to make contact with those
holding the statue and to negotiate its turnover. "236 It is unknown whether
money was paid to those holding the statue or simply promises of pay-
ment.
237
When the statue was found, it was covered in dirt, indicating that it
may have been concealed in transport, and there were fresh chips along its
stone surface, suggesting recent damage.38 It was returned to Iraqi offi-
cials in a ceremony in Washington, D.C.239 Nevertheless, the statue is not
in Iraq today but rather in the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, D.C., be-
cause, at time of writing, it is still far too dangerous to try to return it to
Baghdad.2' The theft of the statue has not, to date, been the subject of
judicial proceedings. Parties may one day seek to keep it in the United
States for its protection. It is more likely that U.S. courts will see other
cases involving Iraqi treasures where money has changed hands, not un-
like the mosaics case.241
Despite the successful efforts of the FBI to return the statue, this is
another story of failure to recognize and apply the international law on
protection of art in war and occupation. A great deal has been said since
March 2003 about failures to properly plan for the occupation of Iraq.242
Little has been said, in comparison, about the body of international law
that applies to occupation and that includes clear rules on protecting cul-
tural property. As already discussed in the case of the mosaics, these rules
obligate the occupying power to prevent looting of cultural sites and traf-
ficking in cultural objects.243 Yet, according to the San Diego Union Tri-
bune, no orders were given to U.S. forces to protect sensitive sites in Iraq
despite the fact archeologists had warned the Pentagon about the impor-
tance of doing so: "[tihough Pentagon officials were warned as early as
January [2003], and repeatedly since, that a U.S. invasion would place
cultural treasures in grave danger, and though international law mandates
the protection of artistic treasures in times of war, Defense Secretary Do-
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Boehm, supra note 232.
241. See id. The statue might one day be the subject of a suit with respect to its return to Iraq as
parties interested in its protection might well seek to prevent its return. See O'Connell, supra note
223, at 103-08.
242. See, e.g., Jennifer De Poyen, Looting of Iraqi Museum Was a Blow to All Peoples, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TPm., Apr. 20, 2003, at F8, available at 2003 WLNR 16791678.
243. See supra notes 79-111 and accompanying text.
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nald Rumsfeld made the point again and again that soldiers were not there
to stop the plunder. "244
Soon sensitive archeological sites throughout the country were being
looted.245 Some were turned into moonscapes.24  Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld's attitude was summed up in his now infamous comment:
"'Freedom's untidy . . . . And free people are free to make mistakes and
commit crimes and do bad things. ,,247 In April 2003, when asked about
the looting in Iraq, especially in the Iraqi National Museum, he said, "it's
the same picture of some person walking out of some building with a vase,
and you see it 20 times and you think 'My goodness, were there that many
vases? Is it possible that there were that many vases in the whole coun-
try?"'248 The Entemena statue was ironically recovered through the efforts
of the antiquities dealer, Aboutaam, who was himself previously charged
with felonies including forgery of customs documents related to various
artifacts.249
The Entemena and thousands of other invaluable objects might never
have gone missing in the first place if the United States had not invaded in
violation of international law,25° but having done so, the United States.
needed to take its obligations to protect cultural property seriously. Many
agree that the invasion force was too small, but perhaps far more signifi-
cant was the fact troops did not have the right orders, especially with re-
spect to looting and cultural property protection. 251 As already discussed
with respect to the mosaics case and the case of the Klimts, the Hague
Convention (IV) of 1907, to which the United States is a party, includes
an annex of regulations on land warfare.252 Again, Article 56 of the Hague
Regulations requires that "[a]ll seizure of, destruction or wilful damage
done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and
science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceed-
ings."253 And the 1954 Convention applies as customary international law
binding on the United States to "prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a
244. De Poyen, supra note 242.
245. See id.
246. Alexandra Zavis, Iraq's Heritage is Under Assault by Looters, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 1291911.
247. De Poyen, supra note 242.
248. Id.; see also Linda Diebel, Rumsfeld on Chaos in Iraq: 'Stuff Happens,' TORONTO STAR, Apr.
12, 2003.
249. Meier & Glanz, supra note 224, at A12; see also Ron Stodghill, Do You Know Where That
Art Has Been?, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at B3.
250. Regarding the illegality of resort to war in Iraq, see Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN
Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 592-93 (2003); Sean D. Murphy, As-
sessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Adden-
dumn to Armed Force in Iraq: Issues of Legality, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003,
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh99al .htm.
251. See De Poyen, supra note 242.
252. See supra notes 96-99, 109-110 and accompanying text.
253. 1907 Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, supra note 10, art. 56.
1100 [Vol. 59:4:1075
Stories of Art, War, and Greed
stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism directed against, cultural property."' U.S. negligence in Iraq
has truly resulted in a crisis surrounding Iraqi cultural property.255 Only a
few of the high-value, high-quality pieces looted from Iraq had been re-
covered five years after the invasion; the Statue of Entemena is one of the
few.256 At time of writing, looting continues throughout Iraq, and much of
Iraq's infrastructure to protect cultural property is in decline.257
With respect to cultural property, the United States had plenty of no-
tice regarding what would be required.258 Months before the invasion, the
Bush Administration had been warned by a number of organizations and
experts that cultural sites would need protection from bombing and loot-
ing. 21 Considerable looting had occurred after the 1991 Gulf War, so thelikelihood of it occurring again was known:
In January [2003], the Archaeological Institute of America issued
a statement calling on "all governments" to protect cultural sites
both during and after a war. A mix of scholars, museum repre-
sentatives, collectors and dealers made the same case during a
briefing at the Department of Defense. "I did a lot of the talking,"
said McGuire Gibson, an Iraq specialist at the University of Chi-
cago's Oriental Institute. "They had a list of 150 sites, and I said
there were many more than that, and that the biggest problem was
the aftermath. "260
The United States Army War College issued a study, dated February
2003, describing post-conflict requirements in Iraq, including legal re-
quirements. 261 The authors state:
254. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(3).
255. See Boehm, supra note 232; Zavis, supra note 246.
256. Boehm, supra note 232; Meier & Glanz, supra note 224.
257. See Boehm, supra note 232; Zavis, supra note 246.
258. Though, again, as in the previous two cases, we do not know what lawyers closest to Secre-
tary Rumsfeld advised.
259. The following organizations contacted the Administration: "The Archaeological Institute of
America, the American Association of Museum Art Directors, the American Schools of Oriental
Research, and the American Association for Research in Baghdad," among others. Almira Poudrier,
Alas, Babylon! How the Bush Administration Allowed the Sack of Iraq's Antiquities, HUMANIST, July
1, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 WLNR 6780082.
260. Guy Gugliotta, Scholars Fret About Fate of Antiquities After War, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 17, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 4740598; see also Michael D. Lemonick, Lost to the Ages:
Could the U.S. Have Stopped the Looting of Iraq's Priceless Antiques? The Answer is Not That Sim-
ple, TIME, Apr. 28, 2003, at 46, available at 2003 WLNR 13889309.
261. CONRAD C. CRANE & W. ANDREW TERRILL, RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: INSIGHTS,
CHALLENGES, AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO 49-50 (2003),
available at http:/lwww.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/pubResult.cfm/hurl/PublD = 182/.
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While it would be best to let the Iraqis control access to historic
and cultural sites, an occupying power assumes responsibility for
security of such places. Particular attention must be paid to reli-
gious and historic sites that have great importance; their damage
or disruption could fan discontent or inspire violence, not just
within Iraq but around the region.262
As in the previous cases, decision-makers had information as to the re-
levant applicable law in the situation, and they had data from past conflicts
that following the law would support the outcome the United States evi-
dently sought in Iraq. Nevertheless, the law was not applied; the orders to
stop the looting were not given.
Rather than follow the applicable international law, Secretary Rums-
feld and other executive branch members developed their own ad hoc reg-
ulations. Finding the Geneva Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete," White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, along with lawyers in the Justice and
Defense Departments, drafted new memos and regulations for detention,
interrogation, and trial of persons after 9/11.263 Similarly finding the law
of occupation obsolete, the State Department created its own rules for
Iraq.2" At the same time, thousands of cultural objects began to be smug-
gled out of Iraq and placed on the international black market in art and
antiquities." We can expect cases involving purchases to surface in the
United States when Iraqi authorities attempt to get objects back for which
Americans have paid considerable sums. At that point, one hopes the
courts will apply international law as the applicable law governing situa-
tions of war and occupation.
International law exists for these purposes. It has developed through
agreed methods and the participation of the international community. It is
recognized as legitimate. All of these factors indicate the advantages of
following international law that ad hoc solutions simply do not have.
Looking to the international law governing invasion and occupation, in
particular, the law governing protection of cultural property would have
supported the outcomes U.S. decision-makers evidently sought with re-
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President
George W. Bush, regarding Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War
to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD
TO ABU GHARIB 118 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (outlining the ramifications
of the decision by the President to consider al Qaeda and Taliban detainees as prisoners of war on a
case-by-case basis).
264. For the State Department's occupation rules and justification for not applying the Hague
Convention rules, see Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 202-25,
240-46 (2005).
265. See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
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spect to Iraq. Mark Danner wrote of the consequences of failing to stop
the looting in Iraq:
The weeks of looting and disorder that followed not only contin-
ued the destruction of Iraq's infrastructure, preventing the Ameri-
cans from supplying the country with electricity and other basic
services. More important, the looting and mayhem destroyed
American political authority even before it could be established;
such political authority is rooted in the monopoly of legitimate vi-
olence, which the Americans, after standing by during weeks of
chaos and insecurity, were never able to attain.266
CONCLUSIONS
What can we conclude from these three stories of art, law, and war?
We have in the world today extraordinarily wealthy individuals willing to
take advantage of the chaos and desperation created by war to acquire
great art and antiquities.267 Supplying the demand is doing untold damage
to ancient objects and cultural sites. Great cultural treasures are also dis-
appearing from public view and into private collections or hiding places
awaiting sale. International law aims to protect cultural property in time of
war-it seeks to protect it from damage and to control acquisition. The
three stories here give insights into how international law seeks to do this
and how it may be done better if courts, lawyers, and executive branch
officials look to international law to guide their decision-making and ad-
vice.
Turning to international law requires knowledge of the law and recog-
nition of its applicability. Both qualities seem to have declined in the Unit-
ed States in recent decades. It is not entirely clear why this is so. It is also
beyond the scope of this Article to delve too deeply into possible explana-
tions. Briefly, it appears to be that certain developments in the United
States in the 1960s offer some explanation. By that time, international law
began to decline as a subject of prominence in American law schools.
Such highly-ranked law schools as Stanford, Pennsylvania, Chicago, and
Texas had no regular members of faculty teaching and publishing in the
area of public international law in the 1990s. Constitutional law, especially
266. Mark Danner, Iraq: The New War, N.Y. REv. BoOKS, Sept. 25, 2003, at 88.
267. For accounts of the super-heated market in art and antiquities, see Calvin Tomkins, A Fool for
Art, NEW YORKER, Nov. 12, 2007, at 35, and Steven M. L. Aronson, Out of Sight, Eugene V. Thaw
Reflects on the Skyrocketing Prices for Art, ARCHITECTURAL DIG., June 2007, available at
http:/lwww.architecturaldigest.comlresources/notebook/2007/06/thawarticle. See also Melikian,
supra note 126.
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civil rights law, emerged as the leading topic taught in law schools.2 68 In-
ternational law was also under attack from international relations theorists,
scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and his students, who advocated the
pursuit of military power by the United States regardless of international
law. Additionally, Wythe Holt has suggested that American officials be-
came uncomfortable with international law as U.S. law was increasingly
understood solely through positive law theory, to the exclusion of natural
law.269 International law could never be entirely explained by positive law
theory as it is a legal system without a regular parliament and other typical
institutions for producing positive law. All of these developments together
likely helped produce the view held by some American legal scholars and
judges that applying international law is somehow illegitimate as it does
not emanate from U.S. law sources.270
As Justice White explained in Sabbatino, however, the Founders quite
definitely looked to international law, the law created through the consen-
sus of nations.271 International law has always been part of United States
law. To the extent the hesitation respecting international law is related to
natural law, theorists are demonstrating that natural law explanations are
needed for domestic law, too.272 Law, any law, is more than the positive
acts of legislators and executive officers. It incorporates belief, reason,
and higher norms-all aspects of the law better explained in natural law
theory than positivism.
273
To the extent the hesitation regarding international law is related to in-
ternational relations theory, in a world increasingly characterized by glo-
balization and the rise of states like China, the pursuit of cooperation ap-
pears to many international relations scholars as more rational than the
pursuit of military power. Finally, with respect to civil rights, it is also
becoming increasingly clear that the rights of people and duties of gov-
ernments toward them cannot be artificially limited by a state boundary.
268. This can be confirmed to some extent through publication trends in student-ran law journals,
in addition to the number of faculty and course offerings in these different subjects.
269. Remarks to the author at the ALABAMA LAW REVIEW Meador Lecture, April 2007.
270. Andrea Bianchi, International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 751 (2004) ("The different nature of international law and its potentially pervasive effects
on domestic law are frequently a cause for US courts to reject its proper implementation. At the base
of this attitude, which seems to be the prevailing one at the moment, lies the perception that the fun-
damental postulates of the domestic legal order, as enshrined in the Constitution, cannot be altered by
a body of law which does not exclusively emanate from the national societal body."). See also Paul
Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty,
Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
271. See supra text accompanying note 121.
272. This message can be found in STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004), for example.
273. For more on the theory of international law, see MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND
PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT
(2008); THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); LOUIS HENKIN,
HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 329-32 (2d ed. 1979); and OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 135-86 (1995).
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Two years after Republic of Austria v. Altmann274 was decided, Justice
Stevens wrote another opinion for the majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 5
There, the court held that non-Americans being detained by the United
States at Guantfnamo Bay, Cuba, are protected, at a minimum, by com-
mon Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions .276
These and other developments are influencing law school curricula.
International law is increasingly a required course in the United States The
American Society of International Law has developed a program of out-
reach for judges.277 American leadership is changing, and it may only be a
matter of time until most judges and other decision-makers understand
international law and the appropriateness as well as advantages of comply-
ing with it. The advantages include the prospect of better protecting inva-
luable cultural property from those who would exploit the tragedy of war
to acquire it.
274. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
275. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
276. Id. at 2796-97.
277. See e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (2001).
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